ID | Name |
---|---|
T1134.001 | Token Impersonation/Theft |
T1134.002 | Create Process with Token |
T1134.003 | Make and Impersonate Token |
T1134.004 | Parent PID Spoofing |
T1134.005 | SID-History Injection |
Adversaries may make new tokens and impersonate users to escalate privileges and bypass access controls. For example, if an adversary has a username and password but the user is not logged onto the system the adversary can then create a logon session for the user using the LogonUser
function.[1] The function will return a copy of the new session's access token and the adversary can use SetThreadToken
to assign the token to a thread.
This behavior is distinct from Token Impersonation/Theft in that this refers to creating a new user token instead of stealing or duplicating an existing one.
ID | Name | Description |
---|---|---|
S0154 | Cobalt Strike |
Cobalt Strike can make tokens from known credentials.[2] |
G1016 | FIN13 |
FIN13 has utilized tools such as Incognito V2 for token manipulation and impersonation.[3] |
S1060 | Mafalda | |
S0692 | SILENTTRINITY |
SILENTTRINITY can make tokens from known credentials.[5] |
ID | Mitigation | Description |
---|---|---|
M1026 | Privileged Account Management |
Limit permissions so that users and user groups cannot create tokens. This setting should be defined for the local system account only. GPO: Computer Configuration > [Policies] > Windows Settings > Security Settings > Local Policies > User Rights Assignment: Create a token object. [6] Also define who can create a process level token to only the local and network service through GPO: Computer Configuration > [Policies] > Windows Settings > Security Settings > Local Policies > User Rights Assignment: Replace a process level token.[7] Administrators should log in as a standard user but run their tools with administrator privileges using the built-in access token manipulation command |
M1018 | User Account Management |
An adversary must already have administrator level access on the local system to make full use of this technique; be sure to restrict users and accounts to the least privileges they require. |
ID | Data Source | Data Component | Detects |
---|---|---|---|
DS0017 | Command | Command Execution |
Monitor executed commands and arguments to detect token manipulation by auditing command-line activity. Specifically, analysts should look for use of the runas command or similar artifacts. Detailed command-line logging is not enabled by default in Windows.[9] |
DS0009 | Process | OS API Execution |
Monitor for API calls associated with detecting token manipulation only through careful analysis of user activity, examination of running processes, and correlation with other endpoint and network behavior, such as LogonUser and SetThreadToken. Correlate activity with other suspicious behavior to reduce false positives that may be due to normal benign use by users and administrators |