Editing 30 September Movement
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At 5.30 am, [[Suharto]], commander of the Army's Strategic Reserve (KOSTRAD), was woken up by his neighbor<ref name="Sundhaussen_207">Sundhaussen (1982) p. 207.</ref> and told of the disappearances of the generals and the shootings at their homes. He went to [[Kostrad]] HQ and tried to contact other senior officers. He managed to contact and to ensure the support of the commanders of the Navy and the National Police, but was unable to contact the Air Force Commander. He then took command of the Army and issued orders confining all troops to their barracks. |
At 5.30 am, [[Suharto]], commander of the Army's Strategic Reserve (KOSTRAD), was woken up by his neighbor<ref name="Sundhaussen_207">Sundhaussen (1982) p. 207.</ref> and told of the disappearances of the generals and the shootings at their homes. He went to [[Kostrad]] HQ and tried to contact other senior officers. He managed to contact and to ensure the support of the commanders of the Navy and the National Police, but was unable to contact the Air Force Commander. He then took command of the Army and issued orders confining all troops to their barracks. |
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Because of poor planning, the coup leaders had failed to provide provisions for the troops on Lapangan Merdeka, who were becoming hot and thirsty. They were under the impression that they were guarding the president in the palace. Over the course of the afternoon, Suharto persuaded both battalions to give up without a fight, first the Brawijaya battalion, who came over to Kostrad HQ, then the Diponegoro troops, which withdrew to Halim. His troops gave Untung's forces inside the radio station an ultimatum and they also withdrew. By 7 pm Suharto was in control of all the installations previously held by |
Because of poor planning, the coup leaders had failed to provide provisions for the troops on Lapangan Merdeka, who were becoming hot and thirsty. They were under the impression that they were guarding the president in the palace. Over the course of the afternoon, Suharto persuaded both battalions to give up without a fight, first the Brawijaya battalion, who came over to Kostrad HQ, then the Diponegoro troops, which withdrew to Halim. His troops gave Untung's forces inside the radio station an ultimatum and they also withdrew. By 7 pm Suharto was in control of all the installations previously held by 30 September Movement's forces. Now joined by Nasution, at 9 pm he announced over the radio that he was now in command of the Army and that he would destroy the counter-revolutionary forces and save Sukarno. He then issued another ultimatum, this time to the troops at Halim. Later that evening, Sukarno left Halim and arrived in [[Bogor]], where there was another presidential palace.<ref name="ROOSA59">Roosa (2006) p. 59.</ref><ref name="RICKLEFS_270">Ricklefs (1982) p. 270.</ref> |
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Most of the rebel troops fled, and after a minor battle in the early hours of 2 October, the Army regained control of Halim, Aidit flew to [[Yogyakarta (city)|Yogyakarta]] and Dani to [[Madiun]] before the soldiers arrived.<ref name="RICKLEFS_270"/> |
Most of the rebel troops fled, and after a minor battle in the early hours of 2 October, the Army regained control of Halim, Aidit flew to [[Yogyakarta (city)|Yogyakarta]] and Dani to [[Madiun]] before the soldiers arrived.<ref name="RICKLEFS_270"/> |