Plan Dalet

Plan Dalet, or Plan D, (Hebrew: תוכנית ד', Tokhnit dalet) was a plan worked out by the Haganah, a Jewish paramilitary group and the forerunner of the Israel Defense Forces, in Palestine in autumn 1947 to spring 1948. Its purpose is much debated. The plan was a set of guidelines the stated purpose of which was to take control of the territory of the Jewish State and to defend its borders and people, including the Jewish population outside of the borders, in expectation of an invasion by regular Arab armies. "Plan Dalet" called for the conquest and securing of Arab towns and villages inside the area alloted to the Jewish state and along its borders.. In case of resistance, the population of conquered villages was to be expelled outside the borders of the Jewish state. If no resistance was met, the residents could stay put, under military rule. According to other historians such as Walid Khalidi and Ilan Pappe, its purpose was to conquer as much of Palestine and to expel as many Palestinians as possible.

Background

On November 29, 1947 the UN voted to approve the Partition Plan for Palestine for ending the British Mandate and creating an Arab state and a Jewish state. In the immediate aftermath of the United Nations' approval of the Partition plan, the explosions of joy amongst the Jewish community were offset by the expression of discontent amongst the Arab community. On the day after the vote, a spate of Arab attacks left at least eight Jews dead, one in Tel Aviv by sniper fire, and seven in ambushes on civilian buses that were claimed to be retaliations for a LHI raid ten days earlier. Shooting, stoning, and rioting continued apace in the following days. Fighting began almost as soon as the plan was approved, beginning with the Arab Jerusalem Riots of 1947. Soon after, violence broke out and became more and more prevalent. Murders, reprisals, and counter-reprisals came fast on each other's heels, resulting in dozens of victims killed on both sides in the process. The sanguinary impasse persisted as no force intervened to put a stop to the escalating cycles of violence.

From January onwards, operations became increasingly militarized, with the intervention of a number of regiments of the Arab Liberation Army (consisting of volunteers from Arab countries) inside Palestine, each active in a variety of distinct sectors around the different coastal towns. They consolidated their presence in Galilee and Samaria. Abd al-Qadir al-Husayni came from Egypt with several hundred men of the Army of the Holy War. Having recruited a few thousands of volunteers, al-Husayni organised the blockade of the 100,000 Jewish residents of Jerusalem. To counter this, the Yishuv authorities tried to supply the city with convoys of up to 100 armoured vehicles, but the operation became more and more impractical as the number of casualties in the relief convoys surged. By March, Al-Hussayni's tactic had paid off. Almost all of Haganah's armoured vehicles had been destroyed, the blockade was in full operation, and the Haganah had lost more than 100 troops. The situation for those who dwelt in the Jewish settlements in the highly-isolated Negev and North of Galilee was even more critical. According to Ilan Pappé in early March the Yishuv's security leadership did not seem to regard the overall situation as particularly troubling, but instead was busy finalising a master plan.

This situation caused the USA to withdraw their support for the Partition plan, thus encouraging the Arab League to believe that the Palestinians, reinforced by the Arab Liberation Army, could put an end to partition. The British, on the other hand, decided on the 7 February 1948, to support the annexation of the Arab part of Palestine by Transjordan.

The Plan

According to Shabtai Teveth the Yishuv had started to prepare for war already in the early 1940's. In 1947 Ben-Gurion reorganised Haganah and made conscription obligatory. Every Jewish man and woman in the country had to receive military training. Military equipment was procured from stockpiles from the Second World War and from Czechoslovakia and was brought in Operation Balak. There is some disagreement among historians about the precise authors of Plan Dalet. According to some it was the result of the analysis of Yigael Yadin, at that time the temporary head of the Haganah, after Ben-Gurion invested him with the responsibility to come up with a plan in preparation for the announced intervention of the Arab states. According to Ilan Pappé the plan was conceived by the "consultancy", a group of about a dozen military and security figures and specialists on Arab affairs, under the guidance of Ben Gurion. It was finalised and sent to Haganah units in early March 1948. The plan consisted of a general part and operational orders for the brigades, which specified which villages should be targeted and other specific missions. The general section of the plan was also sent to the Yishuv's political leaders. Plan Dalet was implemented from the start of April onwards. This marked the beginning of the second stage of the war in which, according to Benny Morris, the Haganah passed from the defensive to the offensive.

In this plan the Haganah also started the transformation from an underground organization into a regular army. The reorganization included the formation of brigades and front commands. The stated goals included in addition to the reorganization, gaining control of the areas of the planned Jewish state as well as areas of Jewish settlements outside its borders. The control would be attained by fortifying strongholds in the surrounding areas and roads, conquering Arab villages which are close to Jewish settlements and occupying British bases and police stations (from which the British were withdrawing).

The introduction of the plan states:

a) The objective of this plan is to gain control of the areas of the Hebrew state and defend its borders. It also aims at gaining control of the areas of Jewish settlements and concentrations which are located outside the borders (of the Hebrew state) against regular, semi-regular, and small forces operating from bases outside or inside the state.

Later on the plan states:

f) Generally, the aim of this plan is not an operation of occupation outside the borders of the Hebrew state. However, concerning enemy bases lying directly close to the borders which may be used as springboards for infiltration into the territory of the state, these must be temporarily occupied and searched for hostiles according to the above guidelines, and they must then be incorporated into our defensive system until operations cease.

In Section 3b4 the plan prescribes offensive operations to be carried out to consolidate the defensive system:

Mounting operations against enemy population centers located inside or near our defensive system in order to prevent them from being used as bases by an active armed force. These operations can be divided into the following categories:

Destruction of villages (setting fire to, blowing up, and planting mines in the debris), especially those population centers which are difficult to control continuously.

Mounting search and control operations according to the following guidelines: encirclement of the village and conducting a search inside it. In the event of resistance, the armed force must be destroyed and the population must be expelled outside the borders of the state.

The villages which are emptied in the manner described above must be included in the fixed defensive system and must be fortified as necessary.

In the absence of resistance, garrison troops will enter the village and take up positions in it or in locations which enable complete tactical control. The officer in command of the unit will confiscate all weapons, wireless devices, and motor vehicles in the village. In addition, he will detain all politically suspect individuals.

Execution of the plan

The first operation, named Nachshon, consisted of lifting the blockade on Jerusalem. 1500 men from Haganah's Givati brigade and Palmach's Harel brigade conducted sorties to free up the route to the city between 5 April and 20 April. The operation was successful, and enough foodstuffs to last 2 months were trucked into to Jerusalem for distribution to the Jewish population. The success of the operation was assisted by the death of Al-Hassayni in combat. During this time, and independently of Haganah or the framework of Plan Dalet, irregular troops from Irgun and Lehi formations massacred a large number of Arabs at Deir Yassin, an event which, though publicly deplored and criticized by the principal Jewish authorities, had a deep impact on the morale of the Palestinian population.

At the same time, April 4–14, the first large-scale operation of the Arab Liberation Army ended in a "débâcle", having been roundly defeated at Mishmar HaEmek, coinciding with the loss of their Druze allies through defection.

Within the framework of the establishment of Jewish territorial continuity foreseen by Plan Dalet, the forces of Haganah, Palmach and Irgun intended to conquer mixed zones. Palestinian society was shaken. Tiberias, Haifa, Safed, Beisan, Jaffa and Acre fell, resulting in the flight of more than 250,000 Palestinians.

The British had, at that time, essentially withdrawn their troops. The situation pushed the leaders of the neighboring Arab states to intervene, but their preparation was not finalised, and they could not assemble sufficient forces to turn the tide of the war. The majority of Palestinian hopes lay with the Arab Legion of Transjordan's monarch, King Abdullah I, but he had no intention of creating a Palestinian-run state, since he hoped to annex as much of the territory of the British Mandate of Palestine as he could.

In preparation for the offensive, Haganah successfully launched Operations Yiftah and Ben-'Ami to secure the Jewish settlements of Galilee, and Operation Kilshon, which created a united front around Jerusalem.

Outcome of the plan

According to Benny Morris the Plan's execution lasted about eight weeks. In these weeks the Yishuv's position changed dramatically. About 100 Arab villages were conquered and emptied of their inhabitants, and almost all Jewish settlements enjoyed territorial continuity, with the notable exception of Jerusalem. Many Arab leaders left the country and local leadership has collapsed. On the Jewish side, the number of those killed during the execution of the plan was 1,253, where 500 of them were civilians. On the Arab side, the Jewish attacks precipitated a mass exodus of 250,000-300,000 people. According to Benny Morris this "massive demographic upheavel" propelled the Arab states closer to an invasion "about which they were largely unenthousiastic".

The intent of Plan Dalet

The intent of Plan Dalet is subject to much controversy, with historians on the one extreme asserting that it was entirely defensive, and historians on the other extreme asserting that the plan aimed at maximum conquest and expulsion.

Walid Khalidi

Walid Khalidi (General Secretary of the Institute for Palestine Studies) offered this interpretation in an address to the American Committee on Jerusalem:

As is witnessed by the Haganah's Plan Dalet, the Jewish leadership was determined to link the envisaged Jewish state with the Jerusalem corpus separatum. But the corpus separatum lay deep in Arab territory, in the middle of the envisaged Palestinian state, so this linking up could only be done militarily.

Khalidi calls Plan Dalet a "Master Plan for the Conquest of Palestine". He points to the Zionist ideas of transfer and of a Jewish state in all of Palestine, and to the offensive character of the military operations of the Zionists as the main proof of his interpretation.

Benny Morris

In his book on the birth of the Palestinian refugee problem Israeli historian Benny Morris discusses the relevance of the idea of "transfer", i.e. mutually agreed population transfer or one-sided expulsion, in Zionist thinking for what happened to the Palestinian Arabs in 1948. Morris concludes that there is no doubt that there was pre-1948 Zionist support for transfer, that this "transfer thinking" had conditioned the Yishuv's hearts and minds to accept it as natural and inevitable when it happened, but that it was not tantamount to pre-planning, and did not issue in the production of a policy or master plan of expulsion.

On the intent of Plan Dalet Morris writes:

The essence of the plan was the clearing of hostile and potentially hostile forces out of the interior of the territory of the prospective Jewish State, establishing territorial continuity between the major concentrations of Jewish population and securing the future State's borders before, and in anticipation of, the invasion [by Arab states]. The Haganah regarded almost all the villages as actively or potentially hostile

[Plan Dalet] constituted a strategic-doctrinal and carte blanche for expulsions [from villages that resisted or might threaten the Yishuv] by front, brigade, district and battalion commanders (who in each case argued military necessity) and it gave commanders, post facto, formal, persuasive cover for their actions.

Ilan Pappé

In his book "The ethnic cleansing of Palestine" Israeli historian Ilan Pappé asserts that Plan Dalet was a "blueprint for ethnic cleansing":

... this ... blueprint spelled it out clearly and unambiguously: the Palestinians had to go ... The aim of the plan was in fact the destruction of both rural and urban areas of Palestine.

Pappé distinguishes between the general section of Plan Dalet and the operational orders given to the troops. According to Pappé the general section of the plan, which was distributed to politicians, was misguiding as to the real intentions of the Haganah. The real plan was handed down to the brigade commanders "not as vague guidelines, but as clear-cut operational orders for action". Along with the general section, "each brigade commander received a list of the villages or neighborhoods that had to be occupied, destroyed, and their inhabitants expelled".

Henry Laurens

According to the French historian Henry Laurens, the importance of the military dimension of plan Dalet becomes clear by comparing the operations of the Jordanian and the Egyptian armies. The ethnical homogeneity of the coastal area, obtained by the expulsions of the Palestinians eased the halt of the Egyptian advance, while Jewish Jerusalem, located in an Arab population area, was encircled by Jordanian forces.

Yoav Gelber

According to Israeli historian Yoav Gelber Plan Dalet was basically a defensive plan:

"Although it provided for counter-attacks, Plan Dalet was a defensive scheme and its goals were (1) protection of the borders of the upcoming Jewish state according to the partition line; (2) securing its territorial continuity in the face of invasion attempts; (3) safeguarding freedom of movement on the roads and (4) enabling continuation of essential daily routines."

Gelber rejects what he calls the "Palestinian-invented" version of Plan Dalet.

David Tal

Military historian David Tal writes that "the plan did provide the conditions for the destruction of Palestinian villages and the deportation of the dwellers; this was not the reason for the plan’s composition", and that "its aim was to ensure full control over the territory assigned to the Jews by the partition resolution, thus placing the Haganah in the best possible strategic position to face an Arab invasion".

J.C. Bosma

According to J.C. Bosma Plan Dalet and the question of Zionist intent should be seen in the context of the "contradictions of Zionism". Bosma considers that the Zionist imperatives of turning an Arab country into a Jewish one and of, at the same time, acting moral posed a severe problem for Zionism. As a consequence Zionism is susceptible to self-deception and often in need of dubious legitimations:

Ben-Gurion and the military leadership did not send their troops to destroy or "occupy" Palestinian villages without an explanation and legitimation. The troops were ordered to "move to State Dalet for an operative implementation of Plan Dalet". Plan Dalet and its stated defensive rationale were referred to and therefore automatically provided a framework that legitimated these orders. ... the politicians need not worry about the moral side of this, because these actions were justified by a defensive military plan.

Bosma investigated the military logic of Plan Dalet and points out seven aspects of it that are inconsistent with the stated defensive purpose.

Operations of Plan Dalet

Operation	Start date	Objective	Result
Operation Nachshon	1 April	Carve out a corridor connecting Tel Aviv to Jerusalem	Successful
Operation Harel	15 April	A continuation of Nachshon but centered specifically on Arab villages near Latrun	Failed
Operation Bi'ur Hametz	21 April	Capture Haifa	Successful
Operation Yevusi	27 April	Break the siege on Jerusalem	Failed
Operation Hametz	27 April	Capture Jaffa	Successful
Operation Yiftach	28 April	Consolidate control of all the eastern Galilee	Successful
Operation Matateh	3 May	Clear out Arab forces between Tiberias and eastern Galilee	Successful
Operation Maccabi	7 May	Clear out Arab forces near Latrun and penetrate into Ramallah district	Failed
Operation Gideon	11 May	Clear out Arab forces in the Beit She'an valley area	Successful
Operation Barak	12 May	Clear out Arab forces in the northern Negev	Stopped because of Egypt invasion
Operation Ben'Ami	14 May	Clear out Arab forces in Acre	Successful
Operation Kilshon	14 May	Clear out Arab forces in the New City of Jerusalem	Successful
Operation Shfifon	14 May	Break the siege on the Jewish Quarter in the old city of Jerusalem	Failed

See also

• 1948 Palestine war
• Deir Yassin massacre
• Eilabun massacre
• The Ethnic Cleansing of Palestine
• The Sons of Eilaboun

References

• W. Khalidi, "Plan Dalet: master plan for the conquest of Palestine", J. Palestine Studies 18 (1), 1988, p. 4-33 (published earlier in Middle East Forum, November 1961)

• Erskine Childers, "The Other Exodus", The Spectator, 12 May 1961
• Shabtai Teveth, “Ben-Gurion and the Palestinian Arabs: From Peace to War”, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1985

• Ilan Pappé, “The ethnic cleansing of Palestine”, Oxford, Oneworld, 2006

• Benny Morris, ”The Birth of the Palestinian Refugee Problem Revisited”, Cambridge University Press, 2004

• Benny Morris, "1948: A history of the first Arab-Israeli war". Yale University Press, 2008

• Yoav Gelber, "Palestine 1948: War, Escape And The Emergence Of The Palestinian Refugee problem", 2nd ed., Brighton, Sussex Academic Press, 2006

• David Tal, “War in Palestine 1948: strategy and diplomacy”, Routledge, London, 2004

• J.C. Bosma, "Plan Dalet in the context of the contradictions of Zionism", Holy Land Studies 9 (2), 2010, p. 209-227

External links

• MidEast Web Historical Documents - Plan D, March 10, 1948
• A Historical Controversy: The Causes of the Palestinian Refugee Problem
• Video of an interview with Ilan Pappé on the Ethnic Cleansing of Palestinee
• A Documentary film that tells the story of the human toll that Plan Dalet claimed the village of Eilabun.