Gurbux Singh (Brigadier)
Gurbux Singh | |
|---|---|
| Born | c. 1916 Hadali, Punjab Province, British India |
| Died | 2013 (age 97) |
| Allegiance |  India |
| Service/ |  Indian Army |
| Rank |  Brigadier |
| Unit | 48th Indian Infantry Brigade 4th Infantry Division (India) |
| Commands | 48th Indian Infantry Brigade |
| Battles/wars | Annexation of Goa 1962 Sino-Indian War |
| Relations | Sujan Singh Hadaliwale (grandfather) Sir Sobha Singh(father) Lady Sobha Singh (mother) Bhagwant Singh (brother) Khushwant Singh (brother) Daljit Singh (brother) Mohinder Kaur (sister) Governor Ujjal Singh (uncle) Rukhsana Sultana (relative) |
Brigadier Gurbux Singh (c.1916–2013) was an Indian Army General Officer who had fought in various wars such as the Annexation of Goa and was famed in his role in the 1962 Sino-Indian War and the retreat of the Bomdila Pass.[1]
Early life
[edit]He was the son of Sardar Bahadur Sir Sobha Singh, one of the richest contractors in Delhi who built the Rashtrapati Bhavan, India Gate, Secretariat Building, Baroda House and many other buildings which made him the richest man in Delhi.[2]
Military career
[edit]Annexation of Goa
[edit]The 4th Sikh Light Infantry spearheaded the advance to seize Margao port on 19th December, while under Brigadier Gurbux Singh the 48th Brigade followed into.[3] He had the main thrust line from the east, they managed to penetrate the Portuguese defenses on the coast and centre.[4] There were some sharp firefights around Margao, the main Portuguese force for protecting Vasco da Gama having been concentrated here with some armor, artillery and engineer elements.[5] Gurbux Singh managed to capture and force Manuel António Vassalo e Silva to surrender to the Indian Army- though their group has missed the main firefights in the port.[6]
1962 Sino-Indian War
[edit]They were first asked to go from Tezpur to Bomdi-La in a hurry, with any transport they could find. There was oinly the 1st Madras positioned and devoid of troops.[7] Gurbux Singh deployed the Sikh Light Infantry on the left side, they had no digging tools, machetes, mortars or heavy machinery at the time.[8] He was told Bomdi-la had no importance military or political by General Brij Mohan Kaul, at that time everyone was focused on Se-la, so despite Gurbux Singh's protests his troops were milked.[7] He was told by Major General Anant Singh Pathania that Bomdi-la had at least 6 months to prepare its defenses since the Chinese would not attack in the season.[9] Harbaksh Singh who took over for a short time also pushed for Se-la, hence more troops were dispatched.[10] Later one company of Sikh LI was sent to Bhutan, one company of 1 Madras was sent to Dirang Dzong, one company of 5 Guards was sent to Poshing-la.[11] He was left with 9 companies for a defence area requiring 16, he asked for another 4 companies which was accepted but still not given.[11] He was then made to give his entire 5 Guards at Poshing-La which had Chinese movement.[8] He protested that there would be no brigade to defend the area, but neither Kaul nor Pathania envisaged Bomdi-la to have any relevance.[8]
Poshing-la was overwhelmed with the Chinese troops, the 5 Guards retreated to Thembang, they ran out of ammunition there and once again retreated back to Bomdi-la.[12] After all the commotion, he was once again told to sent two companies and two light tanks to Dirang Dzong by General Kaul regardless of the consequences.[13] By early November in a 16 company-brigade position there were only 4 to defend one of the most strategic posts.[11] The communications line was cut off and a siege was laid on Bomdi-la.[9] Later Brigadier Gurbux Singh and his troops were caught outside their fortress as he asked them to evacuate, and he was forced to fight a running battle, the Chinese occupied the hill-tops on November 17-18.[11] On 20th November Brigadier Gurbux Singh after receiving communications from Bomdi-la by Indian soldiers, he came back to Bomdi-la only to find that there were no Chinese troops stationed and there were Indian soldiers there, not in defensive positions, "sitting like stragglers".[14][15] He retreated to Rupa, and then to Chaku after another clash, and then asked to shift to Tezpur out of N.E.F.A. into Assam when the Chinese retreated back to Tibet.[16]
Almost all mistakes, according to the Henderson Brooks-Bhagat Report could be attributed to who were known as the "Kaul Boys" namely Anant Singh Pathania, Hoshiar Singh, Shaitan Singh and Manohar Singh were turned into heroes, but in reality all of their own severe tactical mistakes cost the Indian Army's loss, and in the case of Hoshiar Singh and Shaitan Singh, their own lives.[17] Pathania was given Maha Vir Chakra, Military Cross, Hoshiar Singh an Order of the British Empire, Croix de Guerre, Indian Order of Merit, Vishisht Seva Medal and Shaitan Singh was given a Param Vir Chakra due to Kaul's influence over Nehru (as they were relatives).[18] Brigadier Gurbux Singh and Major Megh Singh Rathore were made scapegoats and court-martialed despite not having done any costly mistakes on their own throughout war, and most mistakes were from bad communications and orders from higher authorities.[19]
Death
[edit]He passed away in New Delhi at the age of 97.[20]
See also
[edit]References
[edit]- ^ Faleiro, Valmiki (24 July 2023). Goa, 1961: The Complete Story of Nationalism and Integration. Penguin Random House India Private Limited. ISBN 978-93-5708-175-7.
- ^ Singh, Khushwant (2003). Truth, Love and a Little Malice: An Autobiography. Penguin Books India. ISBN 978-0-14-302957-1.
- ^ "Marmagoa port" (PDF).
- ^ "Panjim" (PDF).
- ^ Faleiro, Valmiki (24 July 2023). Goa, 1961: The Complete Story of Nationalism and Integration. Penguin Random House India Private Limited. ISBN 978-93-5708-175-7.
- ^ Times, Navhind (14 December 2011). "Goa to honour Operation Vijay heroes | The Navhind Times". Retrieved 14 September 2024.
- ^ a b "Memories of a war we'd like to forget". The Times of India. 21 October 2012. ISSN 0971-8257. Retrieved 14 September 2024.
- ^ a b c "50th anniversary of 1962 India-China conflict: The Heroes of the lost war". India Today. 22 October 2012. Retrieved 14 September 2024.
- ^ a b Das, Gautam (2009). China-Tibet-India: The 1962 War and the Strategic Military Future. Har-Anand Publications. ISBN 978-81-241-1466-7.
- ^ Das, Gautam (2009). China-Tibet-India: The 1962 War and the Strategic Military Future. Har-Anand Publications. ISBN 978-81-241-1466-7.
- ^ a b c d Kaul, B. M. The Untold Story.
- ^ Praval, Major K. C. (1987). Indian Army After Independence. Lancer Publishers LLC. ISBN 978-1-935501-61-9.
- ^ Kar, Hemendra Chandra (1980). Military History of India. Firma KLM. ISBN 978-0-8364-1588-9.
- ^ Das, Gautam (2009). China-Tibet-India: The 1962 War and the Strategic Military Future. Har-Anand Publications. ISBN 978-81-241-1466-7.
- ^ Saigal, J. R. (1979). The Unfought War of 1962: The NEFA Debacle. Allied.
- ^ "https://pahar.in/pahar/Books%20and%20Articles/Indian%20Subcontinent/1991%20War%20in%20High%20Himalaya--the%20Indian%20Army%20in%20Crisis%201962%20by%20Palit%20s.pdf" (PDF).
{{cite web}}: External link in|title= - ^ "https://www.facebook.com/ProudArmyFans/photos/the-cowards-and-the-heroes-of-1962in-our-scriptures-it-is-written-%E0%A4%B5%E0%A5%80%E0%A4%B0-%E0%A4%AD%E0%A5%8B%E0%A4%97%E0%A5%8D%E0%A4%AF-%E0%A4%B5%E0%A4%B8%E0%A5%81%E0%A4%82/10152629570013071/".
{{cite web}}: External link in|title= - ^ "https://www.livemint.com/Opinion/HCs4SMg2ojRh1T024T1KxO/1962-war-debaclethe-errors-Jawaharlal-Nehru-made.html".
{{cite web}}: External link in|title= - ^ "Reasons for the Bomdila debacle". The Times of India. 26 November 2002. ISSN 0971-8257. Retrieved 26 August 2024.
- ^ https://www.pressreader.com/india/hindustan-times-jalandhar/20131230/282153584114166. Retrieved 9 April 2024 – via PressReader.
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