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TECHNIQUES
Enterprise
Reconnaissance
Active Scanning
Gather Victim Host Information
Gather Victim Identity Information
Gather Victim Network Information
Gather Victim Org Information
Phishing for Information
Search Closed Sources
Search Open Technical Databases
Search Open Websites/Domains
Resource Development
Acquire Infrastructure
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Compromise Infrastructure
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Establish Accounts
Obtain Capabilities
Initial Access
Phishing
Supply Chain Compromise
Valid Accounts
Execution
Command and Scripting Interpreter
Inter-Process Communication
Scheduled Task/Job
System Services
User Execution
Persistence
Account Manipulation
Boot or Logon Autostart Execution
Boot or Logon Initialization Scripts
Create Account
Create or Modify System Process
Event Triggered Execution
Hijack Execution Flow
Office Application Startup
Pre-OS Boot
Scheduled Task/Job
Server Software Component
Traffic Signaling
Valid Accounts
Privilege Escalation
Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism
Access Token Manipulation
Boot or Logon Autostart Execution
Boot or Logon Initialization Scripts
Create or Modify System Process
Domain Policy Modification
Event Triggered Execution
Hijack Execution Flow
Process Injection
Scheduled Task/Job
Valid Accounts
Defense Evasion
Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism
Access Token Manipulation
Domain Policy Modification
Execution Guardrails
File and Directory Permissions Modification
Hide Artifacts
Hijack Execution Flow
Impair Defenses
Indicator Removal on Host
Masquerading
Modify Authentication Process
Modify Cloud Compute Infrastructure
Modify System Image
Network Boundary Bridging
Obfuscated Files or Information
Pre-OS Boot
Process Injection
Signed Binary Proxy Execution
Signed Script Proxy Execution
Subvert Trust Controls
Traffic Signaling
Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy Execution
Use Alternate Authentication Material
Valid Accounts
Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion
Weaken Encryption
Credential Access
Brute Force
Credentials from Password Stores
Forge Web Credentials
Input Capture
Man-in-the-Middle
Modify Authentication Process
OS Credential Dumping
Steal or Forge Kerberos Tickets
Unsecured Credentials
Discovery
Account Discovery
Permission Groups Discovery
Software Discovery
Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion
Lateral Movement
Remote Service Session Hijacking
Remote Services
Use Alternate Authentication Material
Collection
Archive Collected Data
Data from Configuration Repository
Data from Information Repositories
Data Staged
Email Collection
Input Capture
Man-in-the-Middle
Command and Control
Application Layer Protocol
Data Encoding
Data Obfuscation
Dynamic Resolution
Encrypted Channel
Proxy
Traffic Signaling
Web Service
Exfiltration
Automated Exfiltration
Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol
Exfiltration Over Other Network Medium
Exfiltration Over Physical Medium
Exfiltration Over Web Service
Impact
Data Manipulation
Defacement
Disk Wipe
Endpoint Denial of Service
Network Denial of Service
Mobile
Initial Access
Execution
Persistence
Privilege Escalation
Defense Evasion
Credential Access
Discovery
Lateral Movement
Collection
Command and Control
Exfiltration
Impact
Network Effects
Remote Service Effects
  1. Home
  2. Techniques
  3. Mobile
  4. Exploit SS7 to Track Device Location

Exploit SS7 to Track Device Location

An adversary could exploit signaling system vulnerabilities to track the location of mobile devices. [1] [2] [3] [4] [5]

ID: T1450
Sub-techniques:  No sub-techniques
Tactic Type: Without Adversary Device Access
Tactic: Network Effects
Platforms: Android, iOS
MTC ID: CEL-38
Version: 1.1
Created: 25 October 2017
Last Modified: 03 February 2019

Mitigations

Mitigation Description
Interconnection Filtering

Detection

Network carriers may be able to use firewalls, Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS), or Intrusion Prevention Systems (IPS) to detect and/or block SS7 exploitation.[6] The CSRIC also suggests threat information sharing between telecommunications industry members.

References

  1. Tobias Engel. (2014, December). SS7: Locate. Track. Manipulate.. Retrieved December 19, 2016.
  2. Tobias Engel. (2008, December). Locating Mobile Phones using SS7. Retrieved December 19, 2016.
  3. 3GPP. (2000, January). A Guide to 3rd Generation Security. Retrieved December 19, 2016.
  1. Positive Technologies. (n.d.). SS7 Attack Discovery. Retrieved December 19, 2016.
  2. Communications Security, Reliability, Interoperability Council (CSRIC). (2017, March). Working Group 10 Legacy Systems Risk Reductions Final Report. Retrieved May 24, 2017.
  3. CSRIC-WG1-FinalReport