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TECHNIQUES
Enterprise
Reconnaissance
Active Scanning
Gather Victim Host Information
Gather Victim Identity Information
Gather Victim Network Information
Gather Victim Org Information
Phishing for Information
Search Closed Sources
Search Open Technical Databases
Search Open Websites/Domains
Resource Development
Acquire Infrastructure
Compromise Accounts
Compromise Infrastructure
Develop Capabilities
Establish Accounts
Obtain Capabilities
Initial Access
Phishing
Supply Chain Compromise
Valid Accounts
Execution
Command and Scripting Interpreter
Inter-Process Communication
Scheduled Task/Job
System Services
User Execution
Persistence
Account Manipulation
Boot or Logon Autostart Execution
Boot or Logon Initialization Scripts
Create Account
Create or Modify System Process
Event Triggered Execution
Hijack Execution Flow
Office Application Startup
Pre-OS Boot
Scheduled Task/Job
Server Software Component
Traffic Signaling
Valid Accounts
Privilege Escalation
Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism
Access Token Manipulation
Boot or Logon Autostart Execution
Boot or Logon Initialization Scripts
Create or Modify System Process
Domain Policy Modification
Event Triggered Execution
Hijack Execution Flow
Process Injection
Scheduled Task/Job
Valid Accounts
Defense Evasion
Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism
Access Token Manipulation
Domain Policy Modification
Execution Guardrails
File and Directory Permissions Modification
Hide Artifacts
Hijack Execution Flow
Impair Defenses
Indicator Removal on Host
Masquerading
Modify Authentication Process
Modify Cloud Compute Infrastructure
Modify System Image
Network Boundary Bridging
Obfuscated Files or Information
Pre-OS Boot
Process Injection
Signed Binary Proxy Execution
Signed Script Proxy Execution
Subvert Trust Controls
Traffic Signaling
Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy Execution
Use Alternate Authentication Material
Valid Accounts
Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion
Weaken Encryption
Credential Access
Brute Force
Credentials from Password Stores
Forge Web Credentials
Input Capture
Man-in-the-Middle
Modify Authentication Process
OS Credential Dumping
Steal or Forge Kerberos Tickets
Unsecured Credentials
Discovery
Account Discovery
Permission Groups Discovery
Software Discovery
Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion
Lateral Movement
Remote Service Session Hijacking
Remote Services
Use Alternate Authentication Material
Collection
Archive Collected Data
Data from Configuration Repository
Data from Information Repositories
Data Staged
Email Collection
Input Capture
Man-in-the-Middle
Command and Control
Application Layer Protocol
Data Encoding
Data Obfuscation
Dynamic Resolution
Encrypted Channel
Proxy
Traffic Signaling
Web Service
Exfiltration
Automated Exfiltration
Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol
Exfiltration Over Other Network Medium
Exfiltration Over Physical Medium
Exfiltration Over Web Service
Impact
Data Manipulation
Defacement
Disk Wipe
Endpoint Denial of Service
Network Denial of Service
Mobile
Initial Access
Execution
Persistence
Privilege Escalation
Defense Evasion
Credential Access
Discovery
Lateral Movement
Collection
Command and Control
Exfiltration
Impact
Network Effects
Remote Service Effects
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  2. Techniques
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  4. Remote System Discovery

Remote System Discovery

Adversaries may attempt to get a listing of other systems by IP address, hostname, or other logical identifier on a network that may be used for Lateral Movement from the current system. Functionality could exist within remote access tools to enable this, but utilities available on the operating system could also be used such as Ping or net view using Net. Adversaries may also use local host files (ex: C:\Windows\System32\Drivers\etc\hosts or /etc/hosts) in order to discover the hostname to IP address mappings of remote systems.

Specific to macOS, the bonjour protocol exists to discover additional Mac-based systems within the same broadcast domain.

ID: T1018
Sub-techniques:  No sub-techniques
Tactic: Discovery
Platforms: Linux, Windows, macOS
Permissions Required: Administrator, SYSTEM, User
Data Sources: Network protocol analysis, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring, Process use of network
CAPEC ID: CAPEC-292
Contributors: RedHuntLabs, @redhuntlabs
Version: 3.0
Created: 31 May 2017
Last Modified: 17 September 2020

Procedure Examples

Name Description
AdFind

AdFind has the ability to query Active Directory for computers.[1][2][3]
APT3

APT3 has a tool that can detect the existence of remote systems.[4][5]
APT32

APT32 has enumerated DC servers using the command net group "Domain Controllers" /domain. The group has also used the ping command.[6]
APT39

APT39 has used nbtscan and custom tools to discover remote systems. [7][8][9]
BloodHound

BloodHound can enumerate and collect the properties of domain computers, including domain controllers.[10]
BRONZE BUTLER

BRONZE BUTLER typically use ping and Net to enumerate systems.[11]
Carbon

Carbon uses the net view command.[12]
Cobalt Strike

Cobalt Strike uses the native Windows Network Enumeration APIs to interrogate and discover targets in a Windows Active Directory network.[13]
Comnie

Comnie runs the net view command
CrackMapExec

CrackMapExec can discover active IP addresses, along with the machine name, within a targeted network.[14]
Deep Panda

Deep Panda has used ping to identify other machines of interest.[15]
Dragonfly 2.0

Dragonfly 2.0 likely obtained a list of hosts in the victim environment.[16]
Epic

Epic uses the net view command on the victim’s machine.[17]
FIN5

FIN5 has used the open source tool Essential NetTools to map the network and build a list of targets.[18]
FIN6

FIN6 used publicly available tools (including Microsoft's built-in SQL querying tool, osql.exe) to map the internal network and conduct reconnaissance against Active Directory, Structured Query Language (SQL) servers, and NetBIOS.[19]
FIN8

FIN8 uses dsquery and other Active Directory utilities to enumerate hosts.[20]
Ke3chang

Ke3chang has used network scanning and enumeration tools, including Ping.[21]
Kwampirs

Kwampirs collects a list of available servers with the command net view.[22]
Leafminer

Leafminer used Microsoft’s Sysinternals tools to gather detailed information about remote systems.[23]
menuPass

menuPass uses scripts to enumerate IP ranges on the victim network. menuPass has also issued the command net view /domain to a PlugX implant to gather information about remote systems on the network.[24][25]
MURKYTOP

MURKYTOP has the capability to identify remote hosts on connected networks.[26]
Net

Commands such as net view can be used in Net to gather information about available remote systems.[27]
njRAT

njRAT can identify remote hosts on connected networks.[28]
Nltest

Nltest may be used to enumerate remote domain controllers using options such as /dclist and /dsgetdc.[29]
Olympic Destroyer

Olympic Destroyer uses Windows Management Instrumentation to enumerate all systems in the network.[30]
OSInfo

OSInfo performs a connection test to discover remote systems in the network[4]
Ping

Ping can be used to identify remote systems within a network.[31]
PoetRAT

PoetRAT used Nmap for remote system discovery.[32]
RATANKBA

RATANKBA runs the net view /domain and net view commands.[33]
Remsec

Remsec can ping or traceroute a remote host.[34]
Rocke

Rocke has looked for IP addresses in the known_hosts file on the infected system and attempted to SSH into them.[35]

Sandworm Team

Sandworm Team has used a tool to query Active Directory using LDAP, discovering information about computers listed in AD.[36]
Shamoon

Shamoon scans the C-class subnet of the IPs on the victim's interfaces.[37]
SHOTPUT

SHOTPUT has a command to list all servers in the domain, as well as one to locate domain controllers on a domain.[38]
Silence

Silence has used Nmap to scan the corporate network, build a network topology, and identify vulnerable hosts.[39]

Soft Cell

Soft Cell used a modified version of nbtscan to identify available NetBIOS name servers over the network as well as ping to identify remote systems.[40]
Sykipot

Sykipot may use net view /domain to display hostnames of available systems on a network.[41]
Threat Group-3390

Threat Group-3390 has used the net view command.[42]
TrickBot

TrickBot can enumerate computers and network devices.[43]
Turla

Turla surveys a system upon check-in to discover remote systems on a local network using the net view and net view /DOMAIN commands. Turla has also used net group "Domain Computers" /domain, net group "Domain Controllers" /domain, and net group "Exchange Servers" /domain to enumerate domain computers, including the organization's DC and Exchange Server.[17][44]
UNC2452

UNC2452 used AdFind to enumerate remote systems.[45]
USBferry

USBferry can use net view to gather information about remote systems.[46]
WannaCry

WannaCry scans its local network segment for remote systems to try to exploit and copy itself to.[47]
Wizard Spider

Wizard Spider has used networkdll for network discovery and psfin specifically for financial and point of sale indicators. Wizard Spider has also used AdFind.exe and nltest/dclist to enumerate domain computers, including the domain controller.[3][48][49][1][50]
yty

yty uses the net view command for discovery.[51]

Mitigations

This type of attack technique cannot be easily mitigated with preventive controls since it is based on the abuse of system features.

Detection

System and network discovery techniques normally occur throughout an operation as an adversary learns the environment. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as Lateral Movement, based on the information obtained.

Normal, benign system and network events related to legitimate remote system discovery may be uncommon, depending on the environment and how they are used. Monitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to gather system and network information. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to gather information. Information may also be acquired through Windows system management tools such as Windows Management Instrumentation and PowerShell.

References

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  7. Hawley et al. (2019, January 29). APT39: An Iranian Cyber Espionage Group Focused on Personal Information. Retrieved February 19, 2019.
  8. Rusu, B. (2020, May 21). Iranian Chafer APT Targeted Air Transportation and Government in Kuwait and Saudi Arabia. Retrieved May 22, 2020.
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  10. Red Team Labs. (2018, April 24). Hidden Administrative Accounts: BloodHound to the Rescue. Retrieved October 28, 2020.
  11. Counter Threat Unit Research Team. (2017, October 12). BRONZE BUTLER Targets Japanese Enterprises. Retrieved January 4, 2018.
  12. GovCERT. (2016, May 23). Technical Report about the Espionage Case at RUAG. Retrieved November 7, 2018.
  13. Strategic Cyber LLC. (2017, March 14). Cobalt Strike Manual. Retrieved May 24, 2017.
  14. byt3bl33d3r. (2018, September 8). SMB: Command Reference. Retrieved July 17, 2020.
  15. Alperovitch, D. (2014, July 7). Deep in Thought: Chinese Targeting of National Security Think Tanks. Retrieved November 12, 2014.
  16. US-CERT. (2018, March 16). Alert (TA18-074A): Russian Government Cyber Activity Targeting Energy and Other Critical Infrastructure Sectors. Retrieved June 6, 2018.
  17. Kaspersky Lab's Global Research and Analysis Team. (2014, August 7). The Epic Turla Operation: Solving some of the mysteries of Snake/Uroburos. Retrieved December 11, 2014.
  18. Bromiley, M. and Lewis, P. (2016, October 7). Attacking the Hospitality and Gaming Industries: Tracking an Attacker Around the World in 7 Years. Retrieved October 6, 2017.
  19. FireEye Threat Intelligence. (2016, April). Follow the Money: Dissecting the Operations of the Cyber Crime Group FIN6. Retrieved June 1, 2016.
  20. Elovitz, S. & Ahl, I. (2016, August 18). Know Your Enemy: New Financially-Motivated & Spear-Phishing Group. Retrieved February 26, 2018.
  21. Smallridge, R. (2018, March 10). APT15 is alive and strong: An analysis of RoyalCli and RoyalDNS. Retrieved April 4, 2018.
  22. Symantec Security Response Attack Investigation Team. (2018, April 23). New Orangeworm attack group targets the healthcare sector in the U.S., Europe, and Asia. Retrieved May 8, 2018.
  23. Symantec Security Response. (2018, July 25). Leafminer: New Espionage Campaigns Targeting Middle Eastern Regions. Retrieved August 28, 2018.
  24. PwC and BAE Systems. (2017, April). Operation Cloud Hopper: Technical Annex. Retrieved April 13, 2017.
  25. FireEye iSIGHT Intelligence. (2017, April 6). APT10 (MenuPass Group): New Tools, Global Campaign Latest Manifestation of Longstanding Threat. Retrieved June 29, 2017.
  26. FireEye. (2018, March 16). Suspected Chinese Cyber Espionage Group (TEMP.Periscope) Targeting U.S. Engineering and Maritime Industries. Retrieved April 11, 2018.
  1. Savill, J. (1999, March 4). Net.exe reference. Retrieved September 22, 2015.
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  3. ss64. (n.d.). NLTEST.exe - Network Location Test. Retrieved February 14, 2019.
  4. Mercer, W. and Rascagneres, P. (2018, February 12). Olympic Destroyer Takes Aim At Winter Olympics. Retrieved March 14, 2019.
  5. Microsoft. (n.d.). Ping. Retrieved April 8, 2016.
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