Data from Removable Media
Adversaries may search connected removable media on computers they have compromised to find files of interest. Sensitive data can be collected from any removable media (optical disk drive, USB memory, etc.) connected to the compromised system prior to Exfiltration. Interactive command shells may be in use, and common functionality within cmd may be used to gather information.
Some adversaries may also use Automated Collection on removable media.
Procedure Examples
Name | Description |
---|---|
APT28 |
An APT28 backdoor may collect the entire contents of an inserted USB device.[1] |
Aria-body |
Aria-body has the ability to collect data from USB devices.[2] |
BADNEWS |
BADNEWS copies files with certain extensions from USB devices toa predefined directory.[3] |
CosmicDuke |
CosmicDuke steals user files from removable media with file extensions and keywords that match a predefined list.[4] |
Crimson |
Crimson contains a module to collect data from removable drives.[5] |
FLASHFLOOD |
FLASHFLOOD searches for interesting files (either a default or customized set of file extensions) on removable media and copies them to a staging area. The default file types copied would include data copied to the drive by SPACESHIP.[6] |
Gamaredon Group |
A Gamaredon Group file stealer has the capability to steal data from newly connected logical volumes on a system, including USB drives.[7][8] |
GravityRAT |
GravityRAT steals files based on an extension list if a USB drive is connected to the system.[9] |
InvisiMole |
InvisiMole can collect jpeg files from connected MTP devices.[10] |
Machete | |
Machete |
Machete had a module in its malware to find, encrypt, and upload files from fixed and removable drives.[12] |
Prikormka |
Prikormka contains a module that collects documents with certain extensions from removable media or fixed drives connected via USB.[13] |
Ramsay |
Ramsay can collect data from removable media and stage it for exfiltration.[14] |
Remsec |
Remsec has a package that collects documents from any inserted USB sticks.[15] |
Rover |
Rover searches for files on attached removable drives based on a predefined list of file extensions every five seconds.[16] |
TajMahal |
TajMahal has the ability to steal written CD images and files of interest from previously connected removable drives when they become available again.[17] |
Turla |
Turla RPC backdoors can collect files from USB thumb drives.[18][19] |
USBStealer |
Once a removable media device is inserted back into the first victim, USBStealer collects data from it that was exfiltrated from a second victim.[20][21] |
Mitigations
This type of attack technique cannot be easily mitigated with preventive controls since it is based on the abuse of system features.
Detection
Monitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to collect files from a system's connected removable media. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to gather data. Data may also be acquired through Windows system management tools such as Windows Management Instrumentation and PowerShell.
References
- Anthe, C. et al. (2015, October 19). Microsoft Security Intelligence Report Volume 19. Retrieved December 23, 2015.
- CheckPoint. (2020, May 7). Naikon APT: Cyber Espionage Reloaded. Retrieved May 26, 2020.
- Lunghi, D., et al. (2017, December). Untangling the Patchwork Cyberespionage Group. Retrieved July 10, 2018.
- F-Secure Labs. (2014, July). COSMICDUKE Cosmu with a twist of MiniDuke. Retrieved July 3, 2014.
- Huss, D.. (2016, March 1). Operation Transparent Tribe. Retrieved June 8, 2016.
- FireEye Labs. (2015, April). APT30 AND THE MECHANICS OF A LONG-RUNNING CYBER ESPIONAGE OPERATION. Retrieved May 1, 2015.
- Kasza, A. and Reichel, D. (2017, February 27). The Gamaredon Group Toolset Evolution. Retrieved March 1, 2017.
- Boutin, J. (2020, June 11). Gamaredon group grows its game. Retrieved June 16, 2020.
- Mercer, W., Rascagneres, P. (2018, April 26). GravityRAT - The Two-Year Evolution Of An APT Targeting India. Retrieved May 16, 2018.
- Hromcova, Z. and Cherpanov, A. (2020, June). INVISIMOLE: THE HIDDEN PART OF THE STORY. Retrieved July 16, 2020.
- ESET. (2019, July). MACHETE JUST GOT SHARPER Venezuelan government institutions under attack. Retrieved September 13, 2019.
- The Cylance Threat Research Team. (2017, March 22). El Machete's Malware Attacks Cut Through LATAM. Retrieved September 13, 2019.
- Cherepanov, A.. (2016, May 17). Operation Groundbait: Analysis of a surveillance toolkit. Retrieved May 18, 2016.
- Sanmillan, I.. (2020, May 13). Ramsay: A cyber‑espionage toolkit tailored for air‑gapped networks. Retrieved May 27, 2020.
- Kaspersky Lab's Global Research & Analysis Team. (2016, August 9). The ProjectSauron APT. Technical Analysis. Retrieved August 17, 2016.
- Ray, V., Hayashi, K. (2016, February 29). New Malware ‘Rover’ Targets Indian Ambassador to Afghanistan. Retrieved February 29, 2016.
- GReAT. (2019, April 10). Project TajMahal – a sophisticated new APT framework. Retrieved October 14, 2019.
- Faou, M. and Dumont R.. (2019, May 29). A dive into Turla PowerShell usage. Retrieved June 14, 2019.
- Symantec DeepSight Adversary Intelligence Team. (2019, June 20). Waterbug: Espionage Group Rolls Out Brand-New Toolset in Attacks Against Governments. Retrieved July 8, 2019.
- Calvet, J. (2014, November 11). Sednit Espionage Group Attacking Air-Gapped Networks. Retrieved January 4, 2017.
- Kaspersky Lab's Global Research and Analysis Team. (2015, December 4). Sofacy APT hits high profile targets with updated toolset. Retrieved December 10, 2015.