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TECHNIQUES
Enterprise
Reconnaissance
Active Scanning
Gather Victim Host Information
Gather Victim Identity Information
Gather Victim Network Information
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Phishing for Information
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Resource Development
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Initial Access
Phishing
Supply Chain Compromise
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Execution
Command and Scripting Interpreter
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Scheduled Task/Job
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User Execution
Persistence
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Pre-OS Boot
Scheduled Task/Job
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Traffic Signaling
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Privilege Escalation
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Access Token Manipulation
Boot or Logon Autostart Execution
Boot or Logon Initialization Scripts
Create or Modify System Process
Domain Policy Modification
Event Triggered Execution
Hijack Execution Flow
Process Injection
Scheduled Task/Job
Valid Accounts
Defense Evasion
Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism
Access Token Manipulation
Domain Policy Modification
Execution Guardrails
File and Directory Permissions Modification
Hide Artifacts
Hijack Execution Flow
Impair Defenses
Indicator Removal on Host
Masquerading
Modify Authentication Process
Modify Cloud Compute Infrastructure
Modify System Image
Network Boundary Bridging
Obfuscated Files or Information
Pre-OS Boot
Process Injection
Signed Binary Proxy Execution
Signed Script Proxy Execution
Subvert Trust Controls
Traffic Signaling
Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy Execution
Use Alternate Authentication Material
Valid Accounts
Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion
Weaken Encryption
Credential Access
Brute Force
Credentials from Password Stores
Forge Web Credentials
Input Capture
Man-in-the-Middle
Modify Authentication Process
OS Credential Dumping
Steal or Forge Kerberos Tickets
Unsecured Credentials
Discovery
Account Discovery
Permission Groups Discovery
Software Discovery
Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion
Lateral Movement
Remote Service Session Hijacking
Remote Services
Use Alternate Authentication Material
Collection
Archive Collected Data
Data from Configuration Repository
Data from Information Repositories
Data Staged
Email Collection
Input Capture
Man-in-the-Middle
Command and Control
Application Layer Protocol
Data Encoding
Data Obfuscation
Dynamic Resolution
Encrypted Channel
Proxy
Traffic Signaling
Web Service
Exfiltration
Automated Exfiltration
Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol
Exfiltration Over Other Network Medium
Exfiltration Over Physical Medium
Exfiltration Over Web Service
Impact
Data Manipulation
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Disk Wipe
Endpoint Denial of Service
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Mobile
Initial Access
Execution
Persistence
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  4. Implant Container Image

Implant Container Image

Adversaries may implant cloud container images with malicious code to establish persistence. Amazon Web Service (AWS) Amazon Machine Images (AMI), Google Cloud Platform (GCP) Images, and Azure Images as well as popular container runtimes such as Docker can be implanted or backdoored. Depending on how the infrastructure is provisioned, this could provide persistent access if the infrastructure provisioning tool is instructed to always use the latest image.[1]

A tool has been developed to facilitate planting backdoors in cloud container images.[2] If an attacker has access to a compromised AWS instance, and permissions to list the available container images, they may implant a backdoor such as a Web Shell.[1] Adversaries may also implant Docker images that may be inadvertently used in cloud deployments, which has been reported in some instances of cryptomining botnets.[3]

ID: T1525
Sub-techniques:  No sub-techniques
Tactic: Persistence
Platforms: AWS, Azure, GCP
Permissions Required: User
Data Sources: Asset management, File monitoring
Contributors: Praetorian
Version: 1.0
Created: 04 September 2019
Last Modified: 25 March 2020

Mitigations

Mitigation Description
Audit

Periodically check the integrity of images and containers used in cloud deployments to ensure they have not been modified to include malicious software.
Code Signing

Several cloud service providers support content trust models that require container images be signed by trusted sources.[4][5]
Privileged Account Management

Limit permissions associated with creating and modifying platform images or containers based on the principle of least privilege.

Detection

Monitor interactions with images and containers by users to identify ones that are added or modified anomalously.

References

  1. Rhino Labs. (2019, August). Exploiting AWS ECR and ECS with the Cloud Container Attack Tool (CCAT). Retrieved September 12, 2019.
  2. Rhino Labs. (2019, September). Cloud Container Attack Tool (CCAT). Retrieved September 12, 2019.
  3. Doman, C. & Hegel, T.. (2019, March 14). Making it Rain - Cryptocurrency Mining Attacks in the Cloud. Retrieved October 3, 2019.
  1. Microsoft. (2019, September 5). Content trust in Azure Container Registry. Retrieved October 16, 2019.
  2. Docker. (2019, October 10). Content trust in Docker. Retrieved October 16, 2019.