Currently viewing ATT&CK v8.2 which was live between October 27, 2020 and April 28, 2021. Learn more about the versioning system or see the live site.
TECHNIQUES
Enterprise
Reconnaissance
Active Scanning
Gather Victim Host Information
Gather Victim Identity Information
Gather Victim Network Information
Gather Victim Org Information
Phishing for Information
Search Closed Sources
Search Open Technical Databases
Search Open Websites/Domains
Resource Development
Acquire Infrastructure
Compromise Accounts
Compromise Infrastructure
Develop Capabilities
Establish Accounts
Obtain Capabilities
Initial Access
Phishing
Supply Chain Compromise
Valid Accounts
Execution
Command and Scripting Interpreter
Inter-Process Communication
Scheduled Task/Job
System Services
User Execution
Persistence
Account Manipulation
Boot or Logon Autostart Execution
Boot or Logon Initialization Scripts
Create Account
Create or Modify System Process
Event Triggered Execution
Hijack Execution Flow
Office Application Startup
Pre-OS Boot
Scheduled Task/Job
Server Software Component
Traffic Signaling
Valid Accounts
Privilege Escalation
Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism
Access Token Manipulation
Boot or Logon Autostart Execution
Boot or Logon Initialization Scripts
Create or Modify System Process
Domain Policy Modification
Event Triggered Execution
Hijack Execution Flow
Process Injection
Scheduled Task/Job
Valid Accounts
Defense Evasion
Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism
Access Token Manipulation
Domain Policy Modification
Execution Guardrails
File and Directory Permissions Modification
Hide Artifacts
Hijack Execution Flow
Impair Defenses
Indicator Removal on Host
Masquerading
Modify Authentication Process
Modify Cloud Compute Infrastructure
Modify System Image
Network Boundary Bridging
Obfuscated Files or Information
Pre-OS Boot
Process Injection
Signed Binary Proxy Execution
Signed Script Proxy Execution
Subvert Trust Controls
Traffic Signaling
Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy Execution
Use Alternate Authentication Material
Valid Accounts
Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion
Weaken Encryption
Credential Access
Brute Force
Credentials from Password Stores
Forge Web Credentials
Input Capture
Man-in-the-Middle
Modify Authentication Process
OS Credential Dumping
Steal or Forge Kerberos Tickets
Unsecured Credentials
Discovery
Account Discovery
Permission Groups Discovery
Software Discovery
Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion
Lateral Movement
Remote Service Session Hijacking
Remote Services
Use Alternate Authentication Material
Collection
Archive Collected Data
Data from Configuration Repository
Data from Information Repositories
Data Staged
Email Collection
Input Capture
Man-in-the-Middle
Command and Control
Application Layer Protocol
Data Encoding
Data Obfuscation
Dynamic Resolution
Encrypted Channel
Proxy
Traffic Signaling
Web Service
Exfiltration
Automated Exfiltration
Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol
Exfiltration Over Other Network Medium
Exfiltration Over Physical Medium
Exfiltration Over Web Service
Impact
Data Manipulation
Defacement
Disk Wipe
Endpoint Denial of Service
Network Denial of Service
Mobile
Initial Access
Execution
Persistence
Privilege Escalation
Defense Evasion
Credential Access
Discovery
Lateral Movement
Collection
Command and Control
Exfiltration
Impact
Network Effects
Remote Service Effects
  1. Home
  2. Techniques
  3. Enterprise
  4. Domain Policy Modification
  5. Domain Trust Modification

Domain Policy Modification: Domain Trust Modification

ID Name
T1484.001 Group Policy Modification
T1484.002 Domain Trust Modification

Adversaries may add new domain trusts or modify the properties of existing domain trusts to evade defenses and/or elevate privileges. Domain trust details, such as whether or not a domain is federated, allow authentication and authorization properties to apply between domains for the purpose of accessing shared resources.[1] These trust objects may include accounts, credentials, and other authentication material applied to servers, tokens, and domains.

Manipulating the domain trusts may allow an adversary to escalate privileges and/or evade defenses by modifying settings to add objects which they control. For example, this may be used to forge SAML Tokens, without the need to compromise the signing certificate to forge new credentials. Instead, an adversary can manipulate domain trusts to add their own signing certificate.

ID: T1484.002
Sub-technique of:  T1484
Tactics: Defense Evasion, Privilege Escalation
Platforms: Azure AD, Windows
Permissions Required: Administrator
Data Sources: Azure activity logs, PowerShell logs, Windows event logs
Contributors: Blake Strom, Microsoft 365 Defender
Version: 1.0
Created: 28 December 2020
Last Modified: 11 January 2021

Procedure Examples

Name Description
UNC2452

UNC2452 changed domain federation trust settings using Azure AD administrative permissions to configure the domain to accept authorization tokens signed by their own SAML signing certificate.[2]

Mitigations

Mitigation Description
Privileged Account Management

Use the principal of least privilege and protect administrative access to domain trusts.

Detection

Monitor for modifications to domain trust settings, such as when a user or application modifies the federation settings on the domain or updates domain authentication from Managed to Federated via ActionTypes Set federation settings on domain and Set domain authentication.[3] This may also include monitoring for Event ID 307 which can be correlated to relevant Event ID 510 with the same Instance ID for change details.[4][5]

Monitor for PowerShell commands such as: Update-MSOLFederatedDomain –DomainName: "Federated Domain Name", or Update-MSOLFederatedDomain –DomainName: "Federated Domain Name" –supportmultipledomain.[6]

References

  1. Microsoft. (2018, November 28). What is federation with Azure AD?. Retrieved December 30, 2020.
  2. Microsoft 365 Defender Team. (2020, December 28). Using Microsoft 365 Defender to protect against Solorigate. Retrieved January 7, 2021.
  3. Microsoft. (2020, December). Azure Sentinel Detections. Retrieved December 30, 2020.
  1. Sygnia. (2020, December). Detection and Hunting of Golden SAML Attack. Retrieved January 6, 2021.
  2. CISA. (2021, January 8). Detecting Post-Compromise Threat Activity in Microsoft Cloud Environments. Retrieved January 8, 2021.
  3. Microsoft. (2020, September 14). Update or repair the settings of a federated domain in Office 365, Azure, or Intune. Retrieved December 30, 2020.