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TECHNIQUES
Enterprise
Reconnaissance
Active Scanning
Gather Victim Host Information
Gather Victim Identity Information
Gather Victim Network Information
Gather Victim Org Information
Phishing for Information
Search Closed Sources
Search Open Technical Databases
Search Open Websites/Domains
Resource Development
Acquire Infrastructure
Compromise Accounts
Compromise Infrastructure
Develop Capabilities
Establish Accounts
Obtain Capabilities
Initial Access
Phishing
Supply Chain Compromise
Valid Accounts
Execution
Command and Scripting Interpreter
Inter-Process Communication
Scheduled Task/Job
System Services
User Execution
Persistence
Account Manipulation
Boot or Logon Autostart Execution
Boot or Logon Initialization Scripts
Create Account
Create or Modify System Process
Event Triggered Execution
Hijack Execution Flow
Office Application Startup
Pre-OS Boot
Scheduled Task/Job
Server Software Component
Traffic Signaling
Valid Accounts
Privilege Escalation
Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism
Access Token Manipulation
Boot or Logon Autostart Execution
Boot or Logon Initialization Scripts
Create or Modify System Process
Domain Policy Modification
Event Triggered Execution
Hijack Execution Flow
Process Injection
Scheduled Task/Job
Valid Accounts
Defense Evasion
Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism
Access Token Manipulation
Domain Policy Modification
Execution Guardrails
File and Directory Permissions Modification
Hide Artifacts
Hijack Execution Flow
Impair Defenses
Indicator Removal on Host
Masquerading
Modify Authentication Process
Modify Cloud Compute Infrastructure
Modify System Image
Network Boundary Bridging
Obfuscated Files or Information
Pre-OS Boot
Process Injection
Signed Binary Proxy Execution
Signed Script Proxy Execution
Subvert Trust Controls
Traffic Signaling
Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy Execution
Use Alternate Authentication Material
Valid Accounts
Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion
Weaken Encryption
Credential Access
Brute Force
Credentials from Password Stores
Forge Web Credentials
Input Capture
Man-in-the-Middle
Modify Authentication Process
OS Credential Dumping
Steal or Forge Kerberos Tickets
Unsecured Credentials
Discovery
Account Discovery
Permission Groups Discovery
Software Discovery
Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion
Lateral Movement
Remote Service Session Hijacking
Remote Services
Use Alternate Authentication Material
Collection
Archive Collected Data
Data from Configuration Repository
Data from Information Repositories
Data Staged
Email Collection
Input Capture
Man-in-the-Middle
Command and Control
Application Layer Protocol
Data Encoding
Data Obfuscation
Dynamic Resolution
Encrypted Channel
Proxy
Traffic Signaling
Web Service
Exfiltration
Automated Exfiltration
Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol
Exfiltration Over Other Network Medium
Exfiltration Over Physical Medium
Exfiltration Over Web Service
Impact
Data Manipulation
Defacement
Disk Wipe
Endpoint Denial of Service
Network Denial of Service
Mobile
Initial Access
Execution
Persistence
Privilege Escalation
Defense Evasion
Credential Access
Discovery
Lateral Movement
Collection
Command and Control
Exfiltration
Impact
Network Effects
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  1. Home
  2. Techniques
  3. Enterprise
  4. Boot or Logon Autostart Execution
  5. Security Support Provider

Boot or Logon Autostart Execution: Security Support Provider

ID Name
T1547.001 Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder
T1547.002 Authentication Package
T1547.003 Time Providers
T1547.004 Winlogon Helper DLL
T1547.005 Security Support Provider
T1547.006 Kernel Modules and Extensions
T1547.007 Re-opened Applications
T1547.008 LSASS Driver
T1547.009 Shortcut Modification
T1547.010 Port Monitors
T1547.011 Plist Modification
T1547.012 Print Processors

Adversaries may abuse security support providers (SSPs) to execute DLLs when the system boots. Windows SSP DLLs are loaded into the Local Security Authority (LSA) process at system start. Once loaded into the LSA, SSP DLLs have access to encrypted and plaintext passwords that are stored in Windows, such as any logged-on user's Domain password or smart card PINs.

The SSP configuration is stored in two Registry keys: HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Lsa\Security Packages and HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Lsa\OSConfig\Security Packages. An adversary may modify these Registry keys to add new SSPs, which will be loaded the next time the system boots, or when the AddSecurityPackage Windows API function is called.[1]

ID: T1547.005
Sub-technique of:  T1547
Tactics: Persistence, Privilege Escalation
Platforms: Windows
Permissions Required: Administrator
Data Sources: DLL monitoring, Loaded DLLs, Windows Registry
Version: 1.0
Created: 24 January 2020
Last Modified: 25 March 2020

Procedure Examples

Name Description
Empire

Empire can enumerate Security Support Providers (SSPs) as well as utilize PowerSploit's Install-SSP and Invoke-Mimikatz to install malicious SSPs and log authentication events.[2]
Lazarus Group

Lazarus Group has rebooted victim machines to establish persistence by installing a SSP DLL.[3]
Mimikatz

The Mimikatz credential dumper contains an implementation of an SSP.[4]
PowerSploit

PowerSploit's Install-SSP Persistence module can be used to establish by installing a SSP DLL.[5][6]

Mitigations

Mitigation Description
Privileged Process Integrity

Windows 8.1, Windows Server 2012 R2, and later versions may make LSA run as a Protected Process Light (PPL) by setting the Registry key HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Lsa\RunAsPPL, which requires all SSP DLLs to be signed by Microsoft. [1] [7]

Detection

Monitor the Registry for changes to the SSP Registry keys. Monitor the LSA process for DLL loads. Windows 8.1 and Windows Server 2012 R2 may generate events when unsigned SSP DLLs try to load into the LSA by setting the Registry key HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Image File Execution Options\LSASS.exe with AuditLevel = 8. [1] [7]

References

  1. Graeber, M. (2014, October). Analysis of Malicious Security Support Provider DLLs. Retrieved March 1, 2017.
  2. Schroeder, W., Warner, J., Nelson, M. (n.d.). Github PowerShellEmpire. Retrieved April 28, 2016.
  3. F-Secure Labs. (2020, August 18). Lazarus Group Campaign Targeting the Cryptocurrency Vertical. Retrieved September 1, 2020.
  4. Deply, B. (n.d.). Mimikatz. Retrieved September 29, 2015.
  1. PowerShellMafia. (2012, May 26). PowerSploit - A PowerShell Post-Exploitation Framework. Retrieved February 6, 2018.
  2. PowerSploit. (n.d.). PowerSploit. Retrieved February 6, 2018.
  3. Microsoft. (2013, July 31). Configuring Additional LSA Protection. Retrieved June 24, 2015.