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  4. Steal or Forge Kerberos Tickets
  5. Kerberoasting

Steal or Forge Kerberos Tickets: Kerberoasting

ID Name
T1558.001 Golden Ticket
T1558.002 Silver Ticket
T1558.003 Kerberoasting
T1558.004 AS-REP Roasting

Adversaries may abuse a valid Kerberos ticket-granting ticket (TGT) or sniff network traffic to obtain a ticket-granting service (TGS) ticket that may be vulnerable to Brute Force.[1][2]

Service principal names (SPNs) are used to uniquely identify each instance of a Windows service. To enable authentication, Kerberos requires that SPNs be associated with at least one service logon account (an account specifically tasked with running a service[3]).[4][5][6][7]

Adversaries possessing a valid Kerberos ticket-granting ticket (TGT) may request one or more Kerberos ticket-granting service (TGS) service tickets for any SPN from a domain controller (DC).[1][2] Portions of these tickets may be encrypted with the RC4 algorithm, meaning the Kerberos 5 TGS-REP etype 23 hash of the service account associated with the SPN is used as the private key and is thus vulnerable to offline Brute Force attacks that may expose plaintext credentials.[2][1] [7]

This same attack could be executed using service tickets captured from network traffic.[2]

Cracked hashes may enable Persistence, Privilege Escalation, and Lateral Movement via access to Valid Accounts.[6]

ID: T1558.003
Sub-technique of:  T1558
Tactic: Credential Access
Platforms: Windows
System Requirements: Valid domain account or the ability to sniff traffic within a domain
Data Sources: Authentication logs, Windows event logs
CAPEC ID: CAPEC-509
Contributors: Praetorian
Version: 1.1
Created: 11 February 2020
Last Modified: 20 October 2020

Procedure Examples

Name Description
Empire

Empire uses PowerSploit's Invoke-Kerberoast to request service tickets and return crackable ticket hashes.[8]
Impacket

Impacket modules like GetUserSPNs can be used to get Service Principal Names (SPNs) for user accounts. The output is formatted to be compatible with cracking tools like John the Ripper and Hashcat.[9]
PowerSploit

PowerSploit's Invoke-Kerberoast module can request service tickets and return crackable ticket hashes.[10][7]
UNC2452

UNC2452 obtained Ticket Granting Service (TGS) tickets for Active Directory Service Principle Names to crack offline.[11]
Wizard Spider

Wizard Spider has used Rubeus, MimiKatz Kerberos module, and the Invoke-Kerberoast cmdlet to steal AES hashes.[12][13][14][15]

Mitigations

Mitigation Description
Encrypt Sensitive Information

Enable AES Kerberos encryption (or another stronger encryption algorithm), rather than RC4, where possible.[2]
Password Policies

Ensure strong password length (ideally 25+ characters) and complexity for service accounts and that these passwords periodically expire.[2] Also consider using Group Managed Service Accounts or another third party product such as password vaulting.[2]
Privileged Account Management

Limit service accounts to minimal required privileges, including membership in privileged groups such as Domain Administrators.[2]

Detection

Enable Audit Kerberos Service Ticket Operations to log Kerberos TGS service ticket requests. Particularly investigate irregular patterns of activity (ex: accounts making numerous requests, Event ID 4769, within a small time frame, especially if they also request RC4 encryption [Type 0x17]).[3][2]

References

  1. EmpireProject. (2016, October 31). Invoke-Kerberoast.ps1. Retrieved March 22, 2018.
  2. Metcalf, S. (2015, December 31). Cracking Kerberos TGS Tickets Using Kerberoast – Exploiting Kerberos to Compromise the Active Directory Domain. Retrieved March 22, 2018.
  3. Bani, M. (2018, February 23). Detecting Kerberoasting activity using Azure Security Center. Retrieved March 23, 2018.
  4. Microsoft. (n.d.). Service Principal Names. Retrieved March 22, 2018.
  5. Microsoft. (2010, April 13). Service Principal Names (SPNs) SetSPN Syntax (Setspn.exe). Retrieved March 22, 2018.
  6. Medin, T. (2014, November). Attacking Kerberos - Kicking the Guard Dog of Hades. Retrieved March 22, 2018.
  7. Schroeder, W. (2016, November 1). Kerberoasting Without Mimikatz. Retrieved March 23, 2018.
  8. Schroeder, W., Warner, J., Nelson, M. (n.d.). Github PowerShellEmpire. Retrieved April 28, 2016.
  1. SecureAuth. (n.d.). Retrieved January 15, 2019.
  2. Schroeder, W. & Hart M. (2016, October 31). Invoke-Kerberoast. Retrieved March 23, 2018.
  3. MSTIC, CDOC, 365 Defender Research Team. (2021, January 20). Deep dive into the Solorigate second-stage activation: From SUNBURST to TEARDROP and Raindrop . Retrieved January 22, 2021.
  4. The DFIR Report. (2020, October 8). Ryuk’s Return. Retrieved October 9, 2020.
  5. Kimberly Goody, Jeremy Kennelly, Joshua Shilko, Steve Elovitz, Douglas Bienstock. (2020, October 28). Unhappy Hour Special: KEGTAP and SINGLEMALT With a Ransomware Chaser. Retrieved October 28, 2020.
  6. DHS/CISA. (2020, October 28). Ransomware Activity Targeting the Healthcare and Public Health Sector. Retrieved October 28, 2020.
  7. The DFIR Report. (2020, November 5). Ryuk Speed Run, 2 Hours to Ransom. Retrieved November 6, 2020.