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Account Discovery: Domain Account

Adversaries may attempt to get a listing of domain accounts. This information can help adversaries determine which domain accounts exist to aid in follow-on behavior.

Commands such as net user /domain and net group /domain of the Net utility, dscacheutil -q groupon macOS, and ldapsearch on Linux can list domain users and groups.

ID: T1087.002
Sub-technique of:  T1087
Tactic: Discovery
Platforms: Linux, Windows, macOS
Permissions Required: User
Data Sources: API monitoring, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring
CAPEC ID: CAPEC-575
Version: 1.0
Created: 21 February 2020
Last Modified: 26 March 2020

Procedure Examples

Name Description
AdFind

AdFind can enumerate domain users.[1][2][3]

Bankshot

Bankshot gathers domain and account names/information through process monitoring.[4]

BloodHound

BloodHound can collect information about domain users, including identification of domain admin accounts.[5]

BRONZE BUTLER

BRONZE BUTLER has used net user /domain to identify account information.[6]

Chimera

Chimera has has used net user /dom to enumerate domain accounts.[7]

Cobalt Strike

Cobalt Strike can determine if the user on an infected machine is in the admin or domain admin group.[8]

CrackMapExec

CrackMapExec can enumerate the domain user accounts on a targeted system.[9]

Dragonfly 2.0

Dragonfly 2.0 used batch scripts to enumerate users on a victim domain controller.[10]

dsquery

dsquery can be used to gather information on user accounts within a domain.[11]

Empire

Empire can acquire local and domain user account information.[12]

FIN6

FIN6 has used Metasploit’s PsExec NTDSGRAB module to obtain a copy of the victim's Active Directory database.[13]

IcedID

IcedID can query LDAP to identify additional users on the network to infect.[14]

Ke3chang

Ke3chang performs account discovery using commands such as net localgroup administrators and net group "REDACTED" /domain on specific permissions groups.[15]

menuPass

menuPass has used the Microsoft administration tool csvde.exe to export Active Directory data.[16]

Net

Net commands used with the /domain flag can be used to gather information about and manipulate user accounts on the current domain.[17]

OilRig

OilRig has run net user, net user /domain, net group "domain admins" /domain, and net group "Exchange Trusted Subsystem" /domain to get account listings on a victim.[18]

OSInfo

OSInfo enumerates local and domain users[19]

Poseidon Group

Poseidon Group searches for administrator accounts on both the local victim machine and the network.[20]

PoshC2

PoshC2 can enumerate local and domain user account information.[21]

POWRUNER

POWRUNER may collect user account information by running net user /domain or a series of other commands on a victim.[22]

Sandworm Team

Sandworm Team has used a tool to query Active Directory using LDAP, discovering information about usernames listed in AD.[23]

SoreFang

SoreFang can enumerate domain accounts via net.exe user /domain.[24]

Sykipot

Sykipot may use net group "domain admins" /domain to display accounts in the "domain admins" permissions group and net localgroup "administrators" to list local system administrator group membership.[25]

Turla

Turla has used net user /domain to enumerate domain accounts.[26]

Valak

Valak has the ability to enumerate domain admin accounts.[27]

Wizard Spider

Wizard Spider has identified domain admins through the use of "net group ‘Domain admins’" commands.[28]

Mitigations

Mitigation Description
Operating System Configuration

Prevent administrator accounts from being enumerated when an application is elevating through UAC since it can lead to the disclosure of account names. The Registry key is located at HKLM\ SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\CredUI\EnumerateAdministrators. It can be disabled through GPO: Computer Configuration > [Policies] > Administrative Templates > Windows Components > Credential User Interface: Enumerate administrator accounts on elevation.[29]

Detection

System and network discovery techniques normally occur throughout an operation as an adversary learns the environment. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as Lateral Movement, based on the information obtained.Monitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to gather system and network information. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to gather information. Information may also be acquired through Windows system management tools such as Windows Management Instrumentation and PowerShell.

References

  1. Brian Donohue, Katie Nickels, Paul Michaud, Adina Bodkins, Taylor Chapman, Tony Lambert, Jeff Felling, Kyle Rainey, Mike Haag, Matt Graeber, Aaron Didier.. (2020, October 29). A Bazar start: How one hospital thwarted a Ryuk ransomware outbreak. Retrieved October 30, 2020.
  2. McKeague, B. et al. (2019, April 5). Pick-Six: Intercepting a FIN6 Intrusion, an Actor Recently Tied to Ryuk and LockerGoga Ransomware. Retrieved April 17, 2019.
  3. Goody, K., et al (2019, January 11). A Nasty Trick: From Credential Theft Malware to Business Disruption. Retrieved May 12, 2020.
  4. Sherstobitoff, R. (2018, March 08). Hidden Cobra Targets Turkish Financial Sector With New Bankshot Implant. Retrieved May 18, 2018.
  5. Red Team Labs. (2018, April 24). Hidden Administrative Accounts: BloodHound to the Rescue. Retrieved October 28, 2020.
  6. Counter Threat Unit Research Team. (2017, October 12). BRONZE BUTLER Targets Japanese Enterprises. Retrieved January 4, 2018.
  7. Cycraft. (2020, April 15). APT Group Chimera - APT Operation Skeleton key Targets Taiwan Semiconductor Vendors. Retrieved August 24, 2020.
  8. Dahan, A. et al. (2019, December 11). DROPPING ANCHOR: FROM A TRICKBOT INFECTION TO THE DISCOVERY OF THE ANCHOR MALWARE. Retrieved September 10, 2020.
  9. byt3bl33d3r. (2018, September 8). SMB: Command Reference. Retrieved July 17, 2020.
  10. US-CERT. (2018, March 16). Alert (TA18-074A): Russian Government Cyber Activity Targeting Energy and Other Critical Infrastructure Sectors. Retrieved June 6, 2018.
  11. Microsoft. (n.d.). Dsquery. Retrieved April 18, 2016.
  12. Schroeder, W., Warner, J., Nelson, M. (n.d.). Github PowerShellEmpire. Retrieved April 28, 2016.
  13. FireEye Threat Intelligence. (2016, April). Follow the Money: Dissecting the Operations of the Cyber Crime Group FIN6. Retrieved June 1, 2016.
  14. Kessem, L., et al. (2017, November 13). New Banking Trojan IcedID Discovered by IBM X-Force Research. Retrieved July 14, 2020.
  15. Villeneuve, N., Bennett, J. T., Moran, N., Haq, T., Scott, M., & Geers, K. (2014). OPERATION “KE3CHANG”: Targeted Attacks Against Ministries of Foreign Affairs. Retrieved November 12, 2014.
  1. PwC and BAE Systems. (2017, April). Operation Cloud Hopper: Technical Annex. Retrieved April 13, 2017.
  2. Microsoft. (2017, February 14). Net Commands On Windows Operating Systems. Retrieved March 19, 2020.
  3. Falcone, R. and Lee, B.. (2016, May 26). The OilRig Campaign: Attacks on Saudi Arabian Organizations Deliver Helminth Backdoor. Retrieved May 3, 2017.
  4. Symantec Security Response. (2016, September 6). Buckeye cyberespionage group shifts gaze from US to Hong Kong. Retrieved September 26, 2016.
  5. Kaspersky Lab's Global Research and Analysis Team. (2016, February 9). Poseidon Group: a Targeted Attack Boutique specializing in global cyber-espionage. Retrieved March 16, 2016.
  6. Nettitude. (2018, July 23). Python Server for PoshC2. Retrieved April 23, 2019.
  7. Sardiwal, M, et al. (2017, December 7). New Targeted Attack in the Middle East by APT34, a Suspected Iranian Threat Group, Using CVE-2017-11882 Exploit. Retrieved December 20, 2017.
  8. Cherepanov, A.. (2016, December 13). The rise of TeleBots: Analyzing disruptive KillDisk attacks. Retrieved June 10, 2020.
  9. CISA. (2020, July 16). MAR-10296782-1.v1 – SOREFANG. Retrieved September 29, 2020.
  10. Blasco, J. (2011, December 12). Another Sykipot sample likely targeting US federal agencies. Retrieved March 28, 2016.
  11. Faou, M. (2020, May). From Agent.btz to ComRAT v4: A ten-year journey. Retrieved June 15, 2020.
  12. Salem, E. et al. (2020, May 28). VALAK: MORE THAN MEETS THE EYE . Retrieved June 19, 2020.
  13. The DFIR Report. (2020, October 8). Ryuk’s Return. Retrieved October 9, 2020.
  14. UCF. (n.d.). The system must require username and password to elevate a running application.. Retrieved December 18, 2017.