Signed Binary Proxy Execution: Msiexec
Other sub-techniques of Signed Binary Proxy Execution (11)
Adversaries may abuse msiexec.exe to proxy execution of malicious payloads. Msiexec.exe is the command-line utility for the Windows Installer and is thus commonly associated with executing installation packages (.msi).[1] Msiexec.exe is digitally signed by Microsoft.
Adversaries may abuse msiexec.exe to launch local or network accessible MSI files. Msiexec.exe can also execute DLLs.[2][3] Since it is signed and native on Windows systems, msiexec.exe can be used to bypass application control solutions that do not account for its potential abuse.
Procedure Examples
Name | Description |
---|---|
Duqu |
Duqu has used |
IcedID |
IcedID can inject itself into a suspended msiexec.exe process to send beacons to C2 while appearing as a normal msi application. [5] |
LoudMiner |
LoudMiner used an MSI installer to install the virtualization software.[6] |
Maze |
Maze has delivered components for its ransomware attacks using MSI files, some of which have been executed from the command-line using |
Metamorfo |
Metamorfo has used MsiExec.exe to automatically execute files.[8] |
Ragnar Locker |
Ragnar Locker has been delivered as an unsigned MSI package that was executed with |
Rancor |
Rancor has used |
TA505 |
TA505 has used |
Mitigations
Mitigation | Description |
---|---|
Privileged Account Management |
Restrict execution of Msiexec.exe to privileged accounts or groups that need to use it to lessen the opportunities for malicious usage. |
Detection
Use process monitoring to monitor the execution and arguments of msiexec.exe. Compare recent invocations of msiexec.exe with prior history of known good arguments and executed MSI files or DLLs to determine anomalous and potentially adversarial activity. Command arguments used before and after the invocation of msiexec.exe may also be useful in determining the origin and purpose of the MSI files or DLLs being executed.
References
- Microsoft. (2017, October 15). msiexec. Retrieved January 24, 2020.
- LOLBAS. (n.d.). Msiexec.exe. Retrieved April 18, 2019.
- Co, M. and Sison, G. (2018, February 8). Attack Using Windows Installer msiexec.exe leads to LokiBot. Retrieved April 18, 2019.
- Kaspersky Lab. (2015, June 11). The Duqu 2.0. Retrieved April 21, 2017.
- Kimayong, P. (2020, June 18). COVID-19 and FMLA Campaigns used to install new IcedID banking malware. Retrieved July 14, 2020.
- Malik, M. (2019, June 20). LoudMiner: Cross-platform mining in cracked VST software. Retrieved May 18, 2020.
- Brandt, A., Mackenzie, P.. (2020, September 17). Maze Attackers Adopt Ragnar Locker Virtual Machine Technique. Retrieved October 9, 2020.
- Zhang, X.. (2020, February 4). Another Metamorfo Variant Targeting Customers of Financial Institutions in More Countries. Retrieved July 30, 2020.
- SophosLabs. (2020, May 21). Ragnar Locker ransomware deploys virtual machine to dodge security. Retrieved June 29, 2020.
- Ash, B., et al. (2018, June 26). RANCOR: Targeted Attacks in South East Asia Using PLAINTEE and DDKONG Malware Families. Retrieved July 2, 2018.
- Salem, E. (2019, April 25). Threat Actor TA505 Targets Financial Enterprises Using LOLBins and a New Backdoor Malware. Retrieved May 28, 2019.
- Vilkomir-Preisman, S. (2019, April 2). New ServHelper Variant Employs Excel 4.0 Macro to Drop Signed Payload. Retrieved May 28, 2019.
- Hiroaki, H. and Lu, L. (2019, June 12). Shifting Tactics: Breaking Down TA505 Group’s Use of HTML, RATs and Other Techniques in Latest Campaigns. Retrieved May 29, 2020.